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Abstract. As a variant of the HB authentication protocol
for RFID systems, which relies on the complexity of de-
coding linear codes against passive attacks, Madhavan et
al. presented Non-Linear HB(NLHB) protocol. In contrast
to HB, NLHB relies on the complexity of decoding a class
of non-linear codes to render the passive attacks proposed
against HB ineffective. Based on the fact that there has been
no passive solution for the problem of decoding a random
non-linear code, the authors have claimed that NLHB’s se-
curity margin is very close to its key size.
In this paper, we show that passive attacks against HB
protocol can still be applicable to NLHB and this protocol
does not provide the desired security margin. In our attack,
we first linearize the non-linear part of NLHB to obtain a
HB equivalent for NLHB, and then exploit the passive attack
techniques proposed for the HB to evaluate the security
margin of NLHB. The results show that although NLHB’s
security margin is relatively higher than HB against similar
passive attack techniques, it has been overestimated and, in
contrary to what is claimed, NLHB is vulnerable to passive
attacks against HB, especially when the noise vector in the
protocol has a low weight.
Key Words: RFID, Authentication, LPN problem, HB pro-
tocols.
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1 IN T R O D U C T I O N
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags are forming the next gen-
eration technology for identifying objects, and are poised to supplant
barcodes in near future. Their advantages such as: more storage and
ease of use have caused a universal proliferation of RFID tags in many
commercial as well as national security applications; [1] ranging from
electronic passports [3, 4], contactless credit cards [2], to supply chain
management [5–7].
This widespread deployment of RFID tags has raised some concerns
about their security. On the other hand, RFID tag constraints in process-
ing power and memory make them tougher to deal with in security.
These kinds of constraints dictate a paradigm shift in security provision
for RFIDs which is known as lightweight cryptography.
Lightweight authentication protocol is a subset of lightweight cryp-
tography which tackles providing authentication in highly constrained
environments (e.g RFID systems) as well as security provision to a
reasonable extent [8, 9].
1 .1 NO TAT I O N S
• Ga×b: a× b binary matrix.
• h1×b: 1× b binary vector.
• A⊗ B: matrix multiplication of A and B.
• ⊕: XOR operation.
• xi: ith bit of binary vector x.
• Hwt(.): hamming weight function.
• h⊗ G: matrix multiplication of a vector h into matrix G.
• R, T: Reader and Tag respectively.
1 .2 HB FA M I LY PR O TO C O L S
The HB lightweight authentication protocol proposed by Hopper and
Blum in 2001 [10] is the first in the HB family of protocols. An overview
of a paralleled r-round of the HB protocol is given in Figure 1. This
protocol aims at unilateral authenticating of an RFID tag to a reader
70
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Specifications
−r, η, e:Public parameters.
−ν : d-bit noise vector where: Prob(νi = 1) = η, i = 1, ..., r
HB Protocol
- Secret parameter x ∈ {0, 1}k is shared between R and T.
(1) R : Chooses a random Ak×r matrix.
(2) R⇒ T : A
(3) T : Computes z1×r = (x⊗ A)⊕ ν1×r
(4) T ⇒ R : z
(5) R : ACCEPTS iff Hwt(z⊕ (x⊗ A) ≤ er)
Fig. 1: Parallelized version of an r-round HB protocol
only by lightweight operations. The operations used in this protocol
are one matrix multiplication and some XORs. On the other hand, The
security of this algorithm and some others in this family against passive
attacks is reduced to a well-known NP-hard problem called Learning
with Parity Noise (LPN) problem [11]. The other members of this family
emerged as a result of proposing an attack on the previous one in order
to eliminate the weaknesses and render the prior proposed attacks
ineffective. Some of other members of this family are: HB+ [12],HB++
[13], HB* [14],HB-MP [16],HB] [21] and NLHB [17]. Attacks which have
targeted these authentication protocols consists both passive [18–20]
and active types [21, 22]. In an active attack, the adversary is able to
eavesdrop the transcripts between a reader and a tag as well as being
able to interact with them and manipulate the messages exchanging in
between [23] in order to impersonate either of them. It should be noted
that active attacks involve a broad spectrum of attacks which differ
in adversary’s capabilities (e.g. DET [23] and GRS [21] attack models).
On the contrary, in a passive attack, the adversary has only access to
the transcripts from an arbitrary number of authentication sessions
between a tag and a reader and aims at impersonating either of them.
1 .3 LPN PR O B L E M
If we see from a passive adversary perspective, who has only access to s
number of parallelized r-round HB protocol transcripts(i.e. Ak×n, z1×n, η
where n = s× r) and his goal is to recover secret parameter x, it will
be obvious that she faces a decoding problem of a codeword (x⊗ A)
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generated by a random linear block code A in presence of noise ν [25].
This problem is called LPN problem with parameters k, n, η and has been
shown to be NP-hard in worst case [25].
1 .4 LPN SO LV E R S
In addition to worst case complexity results of the LPN problem, there
are numerous studies on average case complexity [20, 26]. These studies
has led to finding some algorithms to solve the LPN problem under
certain assumptions(LPN solvers). Proposition of these algorithms paved
the way for applying passive attack against some of HB family protocols.
In [20], the BKW algorithm has been reported which can be consid-
ered as an instance of the generalized birthday paradox [27]. In [18],
another algorithm(FMICM) has been proposed inspired by fast corre-
lation attack [24] on ciphers. The solution proposed by the FMICM
algorithm is under the assumption of having low bit rate( kn )and high η.
Besides some deterministic LPN solvers such as the two aforementioned
algorithms, there are some probabilistic algorithms such as CTIN [19]
which accomplish their goal even when the adversary has access to less
amount of transcripts comparing to deterministic ones.
As said, applying any passive attack on HB protocol requires to
utilize an LPN solver algorithm to solve the LPN problem. Thus, the
terms LPN solver and passive attack against HB protocol point to the
same notion and are used interchangeably hereafter.
Using LPN solvers caused a dramatic decrease in security margin
of some of HB family protocols against passive attacks [18, 19]. As an
attempt to search for a variant of the HB, which relies on the complexity
of decoding linear codes against passive attacks, Madhavan et al. pre-
sented Non-Linear HB(NLHB) protocol. In contrast to HB, NLHB relies
on the complexity of decoding a class of non-linear codes to render
the passive attacks proposed against HB ineffective. Based on this fact
that there has been no passive solution for the problem of decoding a
random non-linear code, the authors have claimed that NLHB’s security
margin is very close to its key size.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we present a passive attack on
the NLHB protocol. The idea of our attack is the linearization of the
non-linear part of the NLHB protocol to convert it to an equivalent of
conventional HB protocol. This method has been adopted in order to be
able to deploy the passive attack techniques used against HB on NLHB.
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Specifications
−r, η, p, e:Public parameters
−d = r− p
−ν : d-bit noise vector where: Prob(νi = 1) = η, i = 1, ..., d
NLHB Protocol
- Secret parameter x ∈ {0, 1}k is shared between R and T.
(1) R : Chooses a random Ak×r matrix.
(2) R⇒ T : A
(3) T : Computes z1×d = f (x⊗ A)⊕ ν1×d
(4) T ⇒ R : z
(5) R : ACCEPTS iff Hwt(z⊕ f (x⊗ A)) ≤ ed
Fig. 2: Parallelized version of an r-round NLHB protocol
Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we give a brief description of the NLHB protocol and Section
3 elaborates on our attack method on it. In Section 4, we display the
results of applying our attack on NLHB compared to similar attacks on
HB and eventually, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 DE S C R I P T I O N O F T H E NLHB PR O TO C O L
Figure 2 shows one session of a parallelized r-round version of NLHB
protocol. The tag and reader share a k-bit secret x in advance. The
reader transmits a random k× r challenge matrix A to the tag. Having A
received, the tag computes f (x⊗ A). Subsequently, it also computes z =
f (x⊗ A)⊕ ν, where ν is a noise-vector whose bits are all independently
distributed according to the Bernoulli distribution with parameter η,
just like the noise vector in the HB protocol. x⊗ A is also an r-bit vector
similar to HB, but z differs in size. It is a d-bit vector(d = r − p). On
receiving z, the reader checks whether Hwt(z⊕ f (x⊗ A)) ≤ ed Where
0 < e < η < 0.5. If this is true, reader accepts and this means that the
tag has been authenticated successfully.
2 .1 FU N C T I O N f
The function f used in the protocol is a non-linear function which
maps {0, 1}r to {0, 1}d. Specifically, in [17], the function f is defined as
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p g
2 xi+1xi+2
3 xi+1xi+2 ⊕ xi+1xi+3
xi+1xi+3 ⊕ xi+2xi+3
xi+1xi+2 ⊕ xi+2xi+3 ⊕ xi+3xi+1
4 xi+1xi+4 ⊕ xi+2xi+3
xi+1xi+4 ⊕ xi+2xi+4 ⊕ xi+3xi+4
xi+1xi+4 ⊕ xi+2xi+3 ⊕ xi+3xi+4
Table 1: Proposed g function for NLHB protocol
following:
y = f (x); y ∈ {0, 1}d , x ∈ {0, 1}r (1)
and
yi = xi ⊕ g(xi+1, ..., xi+p) (2)
where g : {0, 1}p → {0, 1} is a non linear boolean function. The authors
have also proposed some specific functions for g corresponding to
parameter p to achieve maximum entropy and lower the complexity
of the protocol (see Table 1). In [17], the authors have shown that for a
general function of f , the existing passive attacks on the HB protocol
family (discussed in section 1.4) do not work on their protocol.
3 PR O P O S E D AT TA C K I N G ME T H O D
3.1 DE S C R I P T I O N
In this section, we present our three-phase passive attack on the NLHB
protocol. In this passive attack, we assume that the attacker has access
to n rounnds of the NLHB protocol where n = s× r (i.e. s sessions of
an r-round protocol) and thus can form matrix A according to (3).
Ak×n = (A1k×r|| . . . ||Ask×r) (3)
where Aik×r is random matrix in i
th session.
Exploiting the passive attack techniques proposed for the HB protocol,
we require to find an HB equivalent of the NLHB protocol. This implies
that we should first find a linear approximation of its non-linear part
and then update its parameters accordingly. Hence, phase I and II of
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p g ≈ g q
2 xi+1xi+2 xi+1 0.75
xi+2 0.75
3 xi+1xi+2 ⊕ xi+1xi+3 xi+1 0.75
xi+1xi+3 ⊕ xi+2xi+3 xi+3 0.75
xi+1xi+2 ⊕ xi+2xi+3 ⊕ xi+3xi+1 xi+2 0.75
4 xi+1xi+4 ⊕ xi+2xi+3 xi+1 0.62
xi+1xi+4 ⊕ xi+2xi+4 ⊕ xi+3xi+4 xi+4 0.75
xi+1xi+4 ⊕ xi+2xi+3 ⊕ xi+3xi+4 xi+2 ⊕ xi+3 ⊕ xi+4 ⊕ 1 0.75
Table 2: Best linear approximation of function g in NLHB protocol and their probabili-
ties
our attack tackle the former and latter implications and phase III is the
utilization of passive attack techniques on the equivalent HB protocol.
Phase I: Linearization
Our objective in this phase is to find a relatively good linear approxima-
tion for non-linear part of NLHB to convert the problem of decoding a
non-linear random code to LPN problem. To do so, we should find a
matrix B such that the probability q in (4) is relatively high.
prob( f (x⊗ A) = (x⊗ A)1×n ⊗ Bn×n∗) = q; n∗ = n− s× p (4)
To construct matrix B, we require to linearize the whole system and
according to (2), the non-linear part of the algorithm is the function
g which will be our target for linearization hereafter. We can use the
Walsh-Hadamard technique [28] to find the best linear approximation
for the boolean function g such that:
g(xi+1, ..., xi+p) ≈
i+p
∑
j=i+1
cjxj (5)
According to Table 2, all functions proposed for NLHB can be linearly
approximated with a relatively high probability. A linear approximation
of all g functions with their probabilities q are shown in Table 2. Having
cjs from linear approximation of g, we can conclude this phase by
calculating matrix B. Similar to matrix A in (3), matrix B for s sessions
has the following structure:
Bn×n∗ = (B1n×d|| . . . ||Bsn×d) (6)
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in which,
blij =

1 if i = j
cj for j = i+ 1, ..., i+ p
0 otherwise
(7)
where i = 1, ..., n; j = 1, ..., n∗; l = 1, ..., s or,
Bln×d =

1 0 0
c1 1 0
c2 c1 0
... c2
...
cp
... . . .
0 cp 0
0 0 0
...
...
...
0 0 cp

; l = 1, ..., s (8)
Phase II: Finding a new linear equivalent protocol
In this phase, we attempt to find an equivalent HB protocol for NLHB
using the linear approximation obtained in previous phase. Since our
approximation is valid with probability q, we can rewrite (4) as follow-
ing to formulate the HB equivalent of our NLHB protocol with new
parameters denoted by ∗.
y = f (xA) = (x⊗ A)⊗ B⊕ e
= (x⊗ A∗)⊕ e (9)
where:
A∗k×n∗ = Ak×n ⊗ Bn×n∗
Prob(ei = 1) = (1− q); i = 1, ..., n∗ (10)
Now, by adding the noise of protocol to both side of (9) we have:
y = f (x⊗ A)⊕ ν = (x⊗ A∗)⊕ ν⊕ e = (x⊗ A∗)⊕ ν∗ (11)
where ν∗ = ν⊕ e.
As ν and e are independent, the probability of error for the new noise
vector can be calculated by (12).
Prob(ν∗i = 1) = η
∗ = Prob(νi = 1) + Prob(ei = 1)−
Prob(νi = 1)× Prob(ei = 1)
= η + (1− q)− (1− q)η. (12)
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As it is apparent from (12), the noise of the equivalent HB protocol(ν∗)
is more than the noise in NLHB protocol. Therefore, in general, the
NLHB protocol is more resistant against the passive attacks comparing
to the HB protocol with the same parameters. Nevertheless, according
to our results in Section 4, this strength is far lower than it has been
claimed and desired.
Phase III: Recovering secret parameter x
Up to here, we have accomplished to find an equivalent HB form for
the NLHB protocol. From now on, the problem of recovering secret
parameter x is an LPN problem with random matrix A∗ and parameters
k, n∗, η∗ (equivalent HB parameters) and therefore can be achieved by
using any of LPN solvers discussed in Section 1.4.
3 .2 CO M P L E X I T Y O F T H E AT TA C K
Complexity of our attack consists of three parts corresponding to each
phase. For phase I, we need to find the best linear approximation for
boolean function g with p variables. This can be done by finding Walsh-
Hadamard coefficients of g with complexity of O(p2p). In phase II, we
just have a matrix multiplication of Ak×n and Bn×n∗ to form A∗. This
process has the compexity of O(knn∗) in general. But due to sparse
form of matrix B in (8), this complexity is reduced to O(kpn∗). Finally,
the complexity of phase III relies on the complexity of the LPN solver
algorithm. So, the complexity of our attack is calculated by (13) in which
the complexity of phases I, II and III are denoted by CI ,CI I and CI I I
respectively.
C = CI + CI I + CI I I = O(p2p) +O(kpn∗) + CI I I
≈ O(kpn∗) + CI I I , n∗ >> p (13)
It should be noted that the complexity which computed in(13) is the
time complexity of our attack. To be more precise, we should calculate
the data complexity of our attack in terms of the amount of protocol
rounds required to apply the attack(n∗) as well. Phase I and II are
applied on the number of rounds of the protocol which are determined
in phase III and these two phases do not impose any additional data
complexity to our attack. Therefore, data complexity of our attack only
relies on the data complexity of LPN solvers discussed in [18–20].
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4 RE S U LT S
In this section, we demonstrate the results of applying our passive
attack using three LPN solvers BKW,FMICM and CTIN on NLHB and
compare the security margins of NLHB(i.e. its equivalent HB) with
HB protocol with the same parameters. Our motivation to do such an
unfair comparison is to demonstrate that security margin of the NLHB
is not far more than th HB protocol with the same parameters.
Tables 3, 4 and 5 show a comparative time and data complexity of
applying passive attacks on NLHB and HB protocol for three different
but low noise probability (η = 0.15, 0.10, 0.05 for HB and correspondent
η∗ = 0.36, 0.32, 0.29 in NLHB respectively) as well as the number of
rounds of the protocol required to apply the attack (data complexity).
As the results show, not only are the passive attacks on HB applicable
to NLHB, but also the security margin of NLHB protocol is not far more
than HB protocol. It is manifest that the results of our attack using
FMICM are remarkably better in comparison with BKW and CTIN.
Furthermore, we can have better results when the noise vector in the
protocol has a lower weights(Table 5).
5 CO N C L U S I O N S
We presented a passive attack against NLHB protocol by finding an
HB equivalent of it and then using some LPN solver techniques. Our
results not only negate the authors claim that their protocol is resistant
to passive attacks on the HB protocol but also show that the NLHB
has not elevated the security margin of the HB remarkably and this is
mainly due to the poor design of the non-linear part of the NLHB.
In summary, what we did is as follows. We:
• targeted Non-Linear HB protocol for passive attack.
• found a linear approximation of the non linear part of the protocol
and converted the protocol to an equivalent HB protocol with
higher noise.
• applied three well-known LPN solver techniques as a passive
attack to the equivalent protocol.
• calculated the complexity of our attack on NLHB.
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9
Time Complexity Data Complexity
Key Length CTIN BKW FMICM CTIN BKW FMICM
HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB
32 221 226 23 215 28 212 23 211 23 215 28 212
64 29 236 231 240 219 222 213 214 231 240 219 222
128 223 278 247 262 235 245 213 215 247 262 235 245
192 239 2118 263 283 252 267 213 216 263 283 252 267
256 256 2162 276 299 271 288 214 216 276 299 271 288
Table 3. Time complexity and Data complexity passive attacks on HB and NLHB
η = 0.15,η∗ = 0.36
Time Complexity Data Complexity
Key Length CTIN BKW FMICM CTIN BKW FMICM
HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB
32 21 213 220 225 28 210 210 213 220 225 28 210
64 24 230 228 237 217 219 210 213 228 237 217 219
128 213 266 244 259 235 238 213 215 244 259 235 238
192 224 2102 257 278 254 263 213 215 257 278 254 263
256 231 2140 270 294 271 285 214 216 270 294 271 285
Table 4. Time complexity and Data complexity passive attacks on HB and NLHB
η = 0.1,η∗ = 0.32
Time Complexity Data Complexity
Key Length CTIN BKW FMICM CTIN BKW FMICM
HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB
32 21 210 217 223 26 28 211 213 217 223 26 28
64 22 226 224 235 212 216 211 213 224 235 212 216
128 25 257 237 257 225 236 214 215 237 257 225 236
192 29 288 250 273 242 254 214 216 250 273 242 254
256 214 2120 260 289 258 276 214 216 260 289 258 276
Table 5. Time complexity and Data complexity passive attacks on HB and NLHB
η = 0.05,η∗ = 0.29
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